We study the problem of optimally investing in nodes of a social network in a competitive setting, wherein two camps aim to drive the average opinion of the population in their own favor. Using a well-established model of opinion dynamics, we formulate the problem as a zero-sum game with its players being the two camps. We derive optimal investment strategies for both camps, and show that a random investment strategy is optimal when the underlying network follows a popular class of weight distributions. We study a broad framework, where we consider various well-motivated settings of the problem, namely, when the influence of a camp on a node is a concave function of its investment on that node, when a camp aims at maximizing competitor's investment or deviation from its desired investment, and when one of the camps has uncertain information about the values of the model parameters. We also study a Stackelberg variant of this game under common coupled constraints on the combined investments by the camps and derive their equilibrium strategies, and hence quantify the first-mover advantage. For a quantitative and illustrative study, we conduct simulations on real-world datasets and provide results and insights.
O PINION dynamics is a natural phenomenon in a system of cognitive agents, and is a well-studied topic across several disciplines. It is highly relevant to applications such as elections, viral marketing, propagation of ideas and behaviors, etc. In this paper, we consider two competing camps who aim to maximize the adoption of their respective opinions in a social network. In particular, we consider a strict competition setting where the opinion value of one camp is denoted by þ1 and that of the other camp by À1; we refer to these camps as good and bad camps respectively. Opinion adoption by a population can be quantified in a variety of ways; here we consider a well-accepted way, namely, the average or equivalently, the sum of opinion values of the nodes in the network [1] , [2] . Hence the good camp's objective would be to drive this sum to be as high as possible, while the bad camp would aim to minimize it.
The average or sum of opinion values of the nodes is of relevance in several applications. In a fund collection scenario, for instance, the magnitude of the opinion value of a node can be viewed as the amount of funds and its sign as the camp towards which it is willing to contribute. Here, the good camp's objective would be to gather maximum funds by convincing the population to contribute for a particular cause (that is, drive the sum of opinion values of the nodes to be as high as possible), while that of the bad camp would be to convince the population to contribute for an opposing cause (that is, drive the sum to be as low as possible). Another example is that of a group of sensors or reporting agents, who are assigned the job of reporting their individual measurements of a particular parameter or event, for example, extent of disaster in a natural or human-inflicted calamity, amount of traffic in an area, microclimate reports (climates in specific regions which cannot be accounted by regular weather reports, e.g., caves, craters, lava tubes, etc.). The resulting measurement would be obtained by averaging the individual values. Here, two competitors may aim to manipulate the resulting average; one perhaps for a good cause of avoiding panic, and the other one for elevating it.
Election is another example, where a node's opinion value has a magnitude of at most 1, since it can vote at most once. Here, the opinion value of a node could be viewed as a proxy for the probability with which it would vote for a camp. For instance, an opinion value of v 2 ½À1; þ1 could imply that the probability of voting for the good camp is ð1 þ vÞ=2 and that of voting for the bad camp is ð1 À vÞ=2. Hence the good (or respectively bad) camp would want to maximize (or respectively minimize) the sum of opinion values, since this sum would indicate the expected number of votes in good camp's favor. Product adoption is another such example where the opinion value of a node would indicate its probability of purchasing product from the company corresponding to the good camp.
It is well known that social networks play a prime role in determining the opinions, preferences, behaviors, etc. of the constituent nodes [3] . There have been efforts to develop models which could determine how the nodes update their opinions based on the opinions of their connections, and hence study the dynamics of opinions in the network [4] .
With such an underlying model of opinion dynamics, a camp would aim to maximize the adoption of its opinion in a network. A camp could act on achieving this objective by strategically investing on selected nodes in a social network who could adopt its opinion; these nodes would, in turn, influence the opinions of their connections, who would then influence the opinions of their respective connections, and so on. Based on the underlying application, this investment could be in the form of money, free products or discounts, attention, convincing discussions, etc. Given that camps have certain budget constraints, the strategy of the good camp hence comprises of how much to invest on each node in the network, so as to maximize the sum of opinion values of the nodes, while that of the bad camp comprises of how much to invest on each node, so as to minimize this sum.
This setup results in a game, and since we consider a strict competition setting with constraints such as budget (and other constraints as we shall encounter), the setup fits into the framework of constrained zero-sum games [5] .
Motivation
There have been studies to identify influential nodes and the amounts to be invested on them, specific to analytically tractable models of opinion dynamics (such as DeGroot) [2] , [6] , [7] . Such studies are important to complement the empirical and experimental studies, since they provide more concrete results and rigorous reasonings behind them. However, most of these studies are based in very preliminary settings and limited framework. This paper aims to consider a broader framework by motivating and analyzing a variety of settings, which could open interesting future directions for a broader analytical study of opinion dynamics.
Throughout the paper, we study settings wherein the investment per node by a camp could be unbounded or bounded. Bounded investments could be viewed as discounts which cannot exceed 100 percent, attention capacity or time constraint of a voter to receive convincing arguments, company policy to limit the number of free samples that can be given to a customer, government policy of limiting the monetary investment by a camp on a voter, etc. As we will see, bounded investments in our model would result in bounded opinion values, which as explained earlier, could be transformed into probability of voting for a party or adopting a product, and hence the expected number of votes or sales in the favor of each camp. We first study in Section 3, a fundamental setting where a camp's influence on a node is a linear function of its investment on that node.
While the linear influence function is consistent with the standard well-established models, the influence of a camp on a node might not increase linearly with the corresponding investment. In fact, several social and economic settings follow the law of diminishing marginal returns, which says that for higher investments, the marginal returns (influence in this context) are lower for a marginal increase in investment. An example of this law is when we watch a particular product advertisement on television; as we watch the advertisement more number of times, its marginal influence tends to get lower. A concave influence function naturally captures this law. We study such an influence function in Section 4, and relate it to the skewness of investment in optimal strategies as well as user perception of fairness.
There are scenarios where a camp may want to maximize the total investment of the competing camp, so as to upset the latter's broad budget allocation, which might lead to reduction in its available budget for future investments or for other channels such as mass media advertisement. The latter may also be forced to implement unappealing actions such as increasing the product cost or seek further monetary sources in order to compensate for its investments. Alternatively, the camps may have been instructed a desired investment strategy by a mediator such as government or a central authority, and deviating from this strategy would incur a penalty. For instance, the mediator itself would have its own broader optimization problem (for its or society's benefit), whose optimal solution would require the camps to devise their investment strategies in a particular desired way. The mediator would then instruct the camps to follow the corresponding desired investment strategies. In case of violation, the mediator could impose a penalty so as to compensate for the suboptimal outcome of its own optimization problem. For similar reasons as mentioned before, a camp may want to maximize the penalty incurred by the competing camp. We study these settings which capture such adversarial behaviors of a camp, in Section 5.
For all of the aforementioned settings, we show in this paper that it does not matter whether the camps strategize simultaneously or sequentially. We use Nash equilibrium as the equilibrium notion to analyze the game in these settings. However, there could be settings where a sequential play would be more natural than a simultaneous one, thus resulting in a Stackelberg game. The sequence may be determined by a mediator or central authority which, for example, may be responsible for giving permissions for campaigning or scheduling product advertisements to be presented to a node. Here, we use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the equilibrium notion. Moreover, since we are concerned with a zero-sum game, we express the equilibrium in terms of maxmin or minmax. Assuming the good camp plays first (without loss of analytical generality), the bad camp would choose a strategy that minimizes the sum of opinion values as a best response to the good camp's strategy. Knowing this, the good camp would want to maximize this minimum value. We motivate two such settings we study in this paper.
It would often be the case that the total attention capacity of a node or the time it could allot for receiving campaigning from both camps combined, is bounded. This leads us to study the game under common coupled constraints (CCC) that the sum of investments by the camps on any node is bounded. These are called common coupled constraints since the constraints of one camp are satisfied if and only if the constraints of the other camp are satisfied, for every strategy profile. We study this setting in Section 6.
Another sequential setting is one that results in uncertainty of information, where the good camp (which plays first) may not have exact information regarding the network parameters. However, the bad camp (which plays second) would have perfect information regarding these parameters, which are either revealed over time or deduced based on the effect of the good camp's investment. Forecasting the optimal strategy of bad camp, we derive a robust strategy for the good camp which would give it a good payoff even in the worst case. We study this setting in Section 7.
It can be noted that the common coupled constraints setting captures the first mover advantage, while the uncertainty setting captures the first mover disadvantage.
Related Work
A principal part of opinion dynamics in a population is how nodes update their opinions over time. DeGroot model [8] is one such well-established model which addresses this, where each node updates its opinion using a weighted convex combination of its neighbors' opinions. The model developed by Friedkin and Johnsen [9] , [10] considers that, in addition to its neighbors' opinions, a node also gives certain weightage to its initial biased opinion.
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [4] review several other models of opinion dynamics. Lorenz [11] surveys modeling frameworks concerning continuous opinion dynamics under bounded confidence, wherein nodes pay more attention to beliefs that do not differ too much from their own. Xia, Wang, and Xuan [12] give a multidisciplinary review of the field of opinion dynamics as a combination of the social processes which are conventionally studied in social sciences, and the analytical and computational tools developed in mathematics, physics, and complex system studies. Das, Gollapudi, and Munagala [13] show that the widely studied theoretical models of opinion dynamics do not explain their experimental observations, and hence propose a new model as a combination of DeGroot model and Voter model [14] , [15] . Parsegov et al. [16] develop a multidimensional extension of Friedkin-Johnsen model, describing the evolution of the nodes' opinions on several interdependent topics.
Ghaderi and Srikant [17] consider a setting where a node iteratively updates its opinion as a myopic best response to the opinions of its own and its neighbors, and hence study how the equilibrium and convergence to it depend on the network structure, initial opinions of the nodes, the location of stubborn agents (forceful nodes with unchanging opinions) and the extent of their stubbornness. Ben-Ameur, Bianchi, and Jakubowicz [18] analyze the convergence of some widespread gossip algorithms in the presence of stubborn agents and show that the network is driven to a state which exclusively depends on the stubborn agents. Jia et al. [19] propose an empirical model combining the DeGroot and Friedkin models, and hence study the evolution of selfappraisal, social power, and interpersonal influences for a group of nodes who discuss and form opinions. Halu et al. [20] consider two interacting social networks, and hence study the case of political elections using simulations.
Yildiz, Ozdaglar, and Acemoglu [21] study optimal placement of stubborn agents in the discrete binary opinions setting, given the location of competing stubborn agents. Gionis, Terzi, and Tsaparas [1] study from an algorithmic and experimental perspective, the problem of identifying a set of target nodes whose positive opinions about an information item would maximize the overall positive opinion for the item in the network. Ballester, Calv o-Armengol, and Zenou [22] study optimal targeting by analyzing a noncooperative network game with local payoff complementarities. Sobehy et al. [23] propose strategies to win an election using a Mixed Integer Linear Programming approach.
The basic model we study is similar to that considered by Grabisch et al. [2] , that is, a zero-sum game with two camps holding distinct binary opinion values, aiming to select a set of nodes to invest on, so as to influence the average opinion that eventually emerges in the network. Their study, however, considers non-negative matrices and focuses on the existence and the characterization of equilibria in a preliminary setting, where the influence and cost functions are linear, camps have network information with certainty, and there is no bound on combined investment by the camps per node. Dubey, Garg, and De Meyer [6] study existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, while also considering convex cost functions. The study, however, does not consider the possibility of bounded investment on a node, and the implications on the extent of skewness of investment and user perception of fairness owing to the convexity of cost functions. Bimpikis, Ozdaglar, and Yildiz [7] provide a sharp characterization of the optimal targeted advertizing strategies and highlight their dependence on the underlying social network structure, in a preliminary setting. Their study emphasizes the effect of absoption centrality, which is encountered in our study as well.
The problem of maximizing information diffusion in social networks under popular models such as Independent Cascade and Linear Threshold, has been extensively studied [3] , [24] , [25] . The competitive setting has resulted in several game theoretic studies of this problem [26] , [27] , [28] . There have been preliminary studies addressing interaction among different informations, where the spread of one information influences the spread of the others [29] , [30] .
There have been studies on games with constraints. A notable study by Rosen [31] shows existence of equilibrium in a constrained game, and its uniqueness in a strictly concave game. Altman and Solan [32] study constrained games, where the strategy set available to a player depends on the choice of strategies made by other players. The authors show that, in constrained zero-sum games, the value of the game need not exist (that is, maxmin and minmax values need not be the same) and contrary to general functions, maxmin value could be larger than minmax.
The topic of decision under uncertainty has been of interest to the game theory and optimization communities. An established way of analyzing decision under uncertainty is using robust optimization tools. Ben-Tal, El Ghaoui, and Nemirovski [33] present a thorough review of such tools.
Contributions of the Paper
This work aims to provide a broad framework for optimal investment strategies for competing camps in a social network, while proposing and exploring its several aspects. In particular, we study several well-motivated variants of a constrained zero-sum game where two competing camps aim to maximize the adoption of their respective opinions, under the well-established Friedkin-Johnsen model of opinion dynamics. Following are our specific contributions:
We show that a random investment strategy is optimal when the underlying network follows a particular popular class of weight distributions. (Section 3.3) We investigate the setting where a camp's influence on a node is a concave function of its investment, under unbounded as well as bounded investment. We hence provide implications for the skewness of optimal investment strategies and user perception of fairness. (Section 4) We look at the complementary problem where a camp acts as an adversary to the competing camp by aiming to maximize the latter's investment. We also look at the problem where a camp aims to maximize the deviation from the desired investment of the competing camp. (Section 5) We study the Stackelberg variant under common coupled constraints, that the combined investment by the good and bad camps on any given node cannot exceed a certain limit. We study the maxmin and minmax values and present some interesting implications. (Section 6) We analyze a setting where one of the camps would need to make decision under uncertainty. (Section 7) Using simulations, we illustrate our analytically derived results on real-world social networks, and present further insights based on our observations. (Section 8)
MODEL
Consider a social network with N as its set of nodes and E as its set of weighted, directed edges. Two camps (good and bad) aim to maximize the adoption of their respective opinions in the network. We consider a strict competition, where the opinion value of the good camp is denoted by þ1 and that of the bad camp by À1. In this section, we present the parameters of the considered opinion dynamics model, and the update rule along with its convergence result. We first provide an introduction to the well-established Friedkin-Johnsen model, followed by our proposed extension.
Friedkin-Johnsen Model
As per Friedkin-Johnsen model [9] , [10] , prior to the process of opinion dynamics, every node holds a bias in opinion which could have been formed owing to various factors such as the node's fundamental views, its experiences, past information from news and other sources, opinion dynamics in the past, etc. We denote this opinion bias of a node i by v 0 i and the weightage that the node attributes to it by w 0 ii . The network effect is captured by how much a node is influenced by each of its friends or connections, that is, how much weightage is attributed by a node to the opinion of each of its connections. Let v j be the opinion held by node j and w ij be the weightage attributed by node i to the opinion of node j. The influence on node i owing to node j is given by w ij v j , thus the net influence on i owing to all of its connections is P j2N w ij v j (where w ij 6 ¼ 0 only if j is a connection of i). Note that we do not make any assumptions regarding the sign of the edge weights, that is, they could be negative as well (as justified in [34] , [35] ). A negative edge weight w ij can be interpreted as distrust that node i holds on node j, that is, i would be driven towards adopting an opinion that is opposite to that held or suggested by j.
Since in Friedkin-Johnsen model, each node updates its opinion using a weighted convex combination of its neighbors' opinions, the update rule is given by
jw ij j 1:
Our Extended Model
We extend Friedkin-Johnsen model to incorporate the camps' investments and the weightage attributed by nodes to the camps' opinions. The good and bad camps attempt to directly influence the nodes so that their opinions are driven towards being positive and negative, respectively. This direct influence depends on the investment or effort made by the camps, and also on how much a node weighs the camps' opinions. A given amount of investment may have different influence on different nodes based on how much these nodes weigh the camps' recommendations. We denote the investment made by the good and bad camps on node i by x i and y i respectively, and the weightage that node i attributes to them by w ig and w ib respectively. Since the influence of good camp on node i would be an increasing function of both x i and w ig , we assume the influence to be w ig x i so as to maintain the multilinearity of Friedkin-Johnsen model. Similarly, w ib y i is the influence of bad camp on node i. Also note that since the good and bad camps hold the opinions þ1 and À1 respectively, the net influence owing to the direct recommendations from these camps is ðw ig x i À w ib y i Þ.
The camps have budget constraints stating that the good camp can invest a total amount of k g across all the nodes, while the bad camp can invest a total amount of k b . Table 1 presents the required notation. Consistent with the standard opinion dynamics models, we have the condition on the influence weights on any node i that they sum to at maximum 1 (since a node updates its opinions using a weighted 'convex' combination of the influencing factors).
A standard assumption for guaranteeing convergence of the dynamics is X j2N jw ij j < 1:
This assumption is actually well suited for our model where we would generally have non-zero weights attributed to the influence outside of the network, namely, the influence due to bias (w 0 ii ) and campaigning (w ig ; w ib ). Nodes update their opinions in discrete time steps starting with time step 0. With the aforementioned factors into consideration, each node i updates its opinion at each step, using the following update rule (an extension of the Friedkin-Johnsen update rule):
Let v hti i be the opinion of node i at time step t, and v h0i i ¼ v 0 i . The update rule can hence be written as
For any given node i, the static components are x i ; y i ; v 0 i (which are weighed by w ig ; w ib ; w 0 ii ), while the dynamic components are v j 's (weighed by w ij 's). The static components remain unchanged while the dynamic ones get updated in every time step.
Let w be the matrix consisting of the elements w ij for each pair ði; jÞ (note that w contains only the network weights and not w ig ; w ib ; w 0 ii ). Let v be the vector consisting of the opinions v i , v 0 and w 0 be the vectors consisting of the elements v 0 i and w 0 ii respectively, x and y be the vectors consisting of the investments x i and y i respectively, w g and w b be the vectors consisting of the weights w ig and w ib respectively. Let the operation denote Hadamard product (elementwise product) of vectors, that is, ða bÞ i ¼ a i b i . Let Hadamard power be expressed as ða p Þ i ¼ a p i . Assuming v hti to be the vector consisting of the opinions v hti i , the update rule Equation (1) can be written in matrix form as
Proposition 1. The dynamics defined by the update rule in
Proof. The recursion in Equation (2) can be simplified as
Now, the initial opinion: v h0i ¼ v 0 . Also, w is a strictly substochastic matrix, since 8i 2 N : P j2N jw ij j < 1; its spectral radius is hence less than 1. So when t ! 1, we
h¼0 w h ¼ ðI À wÞ À1 , an established matrix identity [36] . This implicitly means that ðI À wÞ is invertible. Hence,
which is a constant vector, that is, the dynamics converges to this steady state of opinion values. t u
THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM
We now present the fundamental problem of competitive opinion dynamics under the Friedkin-Johnsen model.
Introduction of the Fundamental Problem
The problem of maximizing opinion adoption can be modeled as an optimization problem. In particular, considering perfect competition, this problem can be modeled as a maxmin problem as we now present. Here our objective is to determine the strategies of the good and bad camps (the values of x i and y i such that they satisfy certain constraints), so that the good camp aims to maximize the sum of opinion values of the nodes while the bad camp aims to minimize it. Considering linear constraints for setting the problem in the linear programming framework, we represent these constraints by Ax b and Cy d, respectively, where A; C are matrices and b; d are vectors, in general.
Owing to x i and y i being investments, we have the natural constraints: x i ; y i ! 0; 8i 2 N. We can hence write the maxmin optimization problem in its general form as
So our objective function becomes
This can be achieved by solving two independent optimization problems, namely,
which can be easily solved. the initial biased opinion of node i w 0 ii weightage given to the initial opinion by node i w ig weightage given by node i to the good camp's opinion w ib weightage given by node i to the bad camp's opinion w ij weightage given by node i to the opinion of node j x i investment made by good camp to directly influence node i y i investment made by bad camp to directly influence node i k g budget of the good camp k b
budget of the bad camp v i the resulting opinion of node i
The Specific Case: Overall Budget Constraints
For studying the problem in a broader framework, we consider the case, specific to our model that we introduced in Section 2. This case that considers overall budget constraints k g and k b for the good and bad camps respectively, corresponds to P i2N x i k g and
It is clear that the solution to this specific optimization problem is
and
Note that if max i2N r i w ig 0, then (4) and (5) lead to the following result.
Proposition 2. In Setting 3.1.1, it is optimal for the good and bad camps to invest their entire budgets in node i with maximum value of r i w ig and r i w ib respectively, subject to the value being positive. Insight 1. Parameter r i could be interpreted as the influencing power of node i on the network, while w ig and w ib are respectively the influencing powers of the good and bad camps on node i. So it is clear why these parameters factor into the result. Furthermore, the strategies of the camps are mutually independent, which arises from the sum of steady state values of nodes as derived in Equation (3). The multilinearity of the model and unconstrained investment on nodes allow the camps to exhaust their budgets by concentrating their entire investments on a node possessing the highest value of r i w ig or r i w ib respectively. Also, the camps' strategies are independent of the initial opinions, since they aim to optimize the sum of opinion values without considering their relative values.
Actually, r i can be viewed as a variant of Katz centrality [37] in that, Katz centrality of node i measures its relative influence in a social network (say having adjacency matrix A) with all edges having the same weight (say a), while r i measures its influence in a general weighted social network. Katz centrality of node i is defined as the ith element of vector ððI À aA T Þ À1 À IÞ1
replaced by the weighted adjacency matrix w, for which jrj < 1 (since w is strictly substochastic), and we have a ¼ 1. The subtraction of vector 1 is common for all nodes, so its relative effect can be ignored. r i can also be viewed as a variant of absorption centrality of node i [7] , which captures the expected number of visits to node i in a random walk starting at a node other than i uniformly at random, with transition probability matrix w (assuming all elements of w to be non-negative).
Furthermore, recall that
So if we have w ij ! 0 for all pairs of nodes ði; jÞ, we will have that all elements of vector r are at least 1. That is, w ij ! 0; 8ði; jÞ ¼) r i ! 1; 8i 2 N.
The Case of Bounded Investment per Node
This setting, as motivated earlier, includes an additional bound on the investment per node by a camp. We assume this bound to be 1 unit without loss of generality, that is, x i ; y i 1; 8i 2 N. With respect to the generic constraints Ax b and Cy d, this case corresponds to
From Equation (3), an optimal x can be obtained as follows. Let I r i w ig > 0 ¼ 1 if r i w ig > 0, and 0 otherwise. Let v 1 ; v 2 ; . . . ; v n be the ordering of nodes in decreasing values of r i w ig with any tie-breaking rule. So Equation (3) is maximized with respect to x when
An optimal y is analogous, hence the following result.
Proposition 3. In Setting 3.1.2, it is optimal for the good camp to invest in nodes one at a time, subject to a maximum investment of 1 unit per node, in decreasing order of values of r i w ig until either the budget k g is exhausted or we reach a node with a non-positive value of r i w ig . The optimal strategy of the bad camp is analogous.
Also, from Proposition 1, if a camp's investment per node is bounded by 1 unit, the opinion value of every node would be bounded between À1 and þ1. As stated earlier, such bounded opinion value is relevant to elections and product adoption scenarios, where the bounded opinion value of a node could be translated into the probability of the node voting for a camp or adopting a particular product.
Maxmin versus Minmax Values
With no bounds on investment per node, it is clear that the maxmin and minmax values are the same, since the strategies of the camps are mutually independent, that is,
The equality would hold even with mutually independent bounds on the camps' investment on a node, that is,
It is to be noted that we cannot compare the values in Equations (6) and (7), in general. For instance, if all i's have equal values of r i w ib and only one i has good value of r i w ig , then for k g > 1, the value in Equation (6) would be greater than that in Equation (7). This can be seen using Equation (3); the value of P i2N r i ðw 0 ii v 0 i À w ib y i Þ would stay the same while the value of P i2N r i w ig x i would be higher in Equation (6) than in Equation (7). On the other hand, if all i's have equal values of r i w ig and only one i has good value of r i w ib , then for k b > 1, the value in Equation (7) would be greater than that in Equation (6).
Result for a Popular Class of Weight Distributions
We now present a result concerning a class of distribution of edge weights in a network, which includes the popular weighted cascade (WC) model. 
are suitable for the use of a random strategy, since the decision parameter for either camp (r i w ig ; r i w ib ) holds the same value for all nodes. That is, in these models, a random strategy that exhausts the entire budget is optimal. This class of models includes the popular weighted cascade model, which would assign the weights with a ¼ 3.
EFFECT OF CONCAVE INFLUENCE FUNCTION
The linear influence function Equation (1) without any bound on investment per node, leads to an optimal strategy that concentrates the investment on a single node (Proposition 2). As motivated in Section 1.1, several social and economic settings follow law of diminishing marginal returns, which says that for higher investments, the marginal returns (influence in our context) are lower for a marginal increase in investment. A concave influence function would account for such diminishing marginal influence of a camp with increasing investment on a node which, as we shall see, would advise against concentrated investment on a single node. For the purpose of our analysis so as to arrive at precise closed-form expressions and specific insights, we consider a particular form of concave functions: x 1=t i when the investment is x i . It is to be noted, however, that it can be extended to other concave functions since we use a common framework of convex optimization, however the analysis could turn out to be more complicated or intractable.
The Case of Unbounded Investment per Node
Proposition 5. In Setting 4.1, for t > 1, it is optimal for the good and bad camps to invest in node i proportional to ðr i w ig Þ t tÀ1 and ðr i w ib Þ t tÀ1 , subject to positivity of r i w ig and r i w ib respectively.
A proof of Proposition 5 is provided in supplemental file, available online.
Remark 1 (Skewness of investment). When we compare the results for lower and higher values of t, the investment made by the good camp has an exaggerated correlation with the value of r i w ig for lower values of t. In particular, the investment made is very skewed towards nodes with high values of r i w ig when t is very low, while it is proportional to r i w ig when t is very high. Note that t ¼ 1 corresponds to the linear case in Setting 3.1.1 where the investment is extremely skewed with each camp investing its entire budget on only one node.
Remark 2 (User perception of fairness). The skewness can be linked to user perception of fairness [38] . Suppose a node p is such that r p w pg ¼ max i r i w ig , and it is the unique node with this maximum value. Suppose a node q is such that r q w qg ¼ r p w pg À , where is positive and infinitesimal. From the perspective of node q, the strategy would be fair if the investment in q is not much less than that in p, since they are almost equally valuable. However, t ¼ 1 leads to a highly skewed investment where p receives k g and q receives 0, which can be perceived as unfair by q. As t increases, the investment becomes less skewed; in particular, t ! 1 leads to investment on a node i to be proportional to r i w ig , which could be perceived as fair by the nodes.
The Case of Bounded Investment per Node
With the additional constraints x i 1 and y i 1; 8i 2 N, the optimal investment strategies are given by Proposition 6. We provide its proof in the supplemental file, available online. Proposition 6. In Setting 4.2, if the number of nodes with r i w ig > 0 is less than k g , it is optimal for good camp to invest 1 unit on each node i with r i w ig > 0 and 0 on all other nodes.
If the number of nodes with r i w ig > 0 is at least k g , let g > 0 be the solution of
It can be shown thatĝ exists and is unique; it is then optimal for the good camp to follow the investment strategy:
if r i w ig 2 ð0; tĝ:
The optimal strategy of the bad camp is analogous.
Note that for r i w ig 2 ð0; tĝ, we can alternatively write
nodes with positive values of r i w ig should be classified into two sets, one containing nodes with r i w ig 2 ð0; tĝ (for which x Ã i 2 ð0; 1) and the other containing nodes with r i w ig > tĝ (x Ã i forcefully limited to 1). So we can effectively start with all nodes in the former set (meaning tg ! max i2N r i w ig ) and then transfer nodes to the latter set as per descending values of r i w ig (as we reduce tg), until we have two sets, one with Insight 2. The solution suggests that the optimal strategy can be obtained using a trial-and-error iterative process. A camp could use the optimal strategy for the unbounded case suggested in Proposition 5. If we get x Ã i > 1 for any node, we assign x Ã i ¼ 1 to node i with the highest value of r i w ig , and use Proposition 5 again by excluding node i and decrementing the available budget by 1. This process would be repeated until x Ã i 1; 8i 2 N.
ACTING AS COMPETITOR'S ADVERSARY
In this setting, a camp explicitly acts to maximize the competitor's investment or deviation from its desired investment, that is required to drive the sign of the average opinion value of the population in the latter's favor. Without loss of analytical generality, we consider that the good camp acts as the adversary.
The Case of Unbounded Investment per Node
Proposition 7. In Setting 5.1, it is optimal for the good camp to invest its budget in node i with the maximum value of r i w ig , subject to it being positive. For the bad camp, it is optimal to invest in node i with maximum value of r i w ib , subject to its positivity. (If there does not exist any node i with positive value of r i w ib , it is optimal for the bad camp to not invest at all). The optimal amount of investment made by the bad camp is
A proof of Proposition 7 is provided in supplemental file, available online.
It is to be noted that, contrary to the previous settings, the amount of investment made by the bad camp in this setting is dependent on the good camp's parameters (r i w ig and k g ) as well as the opinion bias parameters (w 0
ii v 0 i ). This is because in the previous settings, the bad camp's objective was to minimize the sum of opinion values without considering the actual value of this sum, while the current setting necessitates the bad camp to ensure that this sum is nonpositive; this requires taking into account the effects of good camp's influence and the initial biases on this sum. Remark 3 (Maximizing competitor's deviation). Let the desired investments for the good and bad camps be x i and y i , respectively. Thus the optimization problem is
Letĝ > 0 be the solution of
Then the good camp's optimal strategy is the following:
If there does not exist aĝ > 0 (because P i:r i w ig < 0 ð x i Þ 2 < k g and no node with r i w ig > 0), we invest 0 on any node with r i w ig < 0 and x i on any node with r i w ig ¼ 0.
This can be proved on similar lines as Proposition 6. Here,
and the optimal square root is determined by sgn ðr i w ig Þ (since a positive r i w ig would mean a higher optimal investment as opposed to a negative r i w ig ). Here, it is possible that a node i is invested on by the good camp even if it has negative r i w ig , so as to have the investment close to x i .
The Case of Bounded Investment per Node
The optimal strategies of the camps can be easily obtained for this setting on similar lines as Proposition 3.
Proposition 8. In Setting 5.2, it is optimal for the good camp to invest in nodes one at a time, subject to a maximum investment of 1 unit per node, in decreasing order of values of r i w ig until either the budget k g is exhausted or we reach a node with a nonpositive value of r i w ig . Say the so derived optimal investment on node i is x Ã i . The optimal strategy of the bad camp is to invest in nodes one at a time, subject to a maximum investment of 1 unit per node, in decreasing order of values of r i w ib until P i2N r i w ib y i ! P j2N r j ðw jg x Ã j þ w 0 jj v 0 j Þ. Note that the terminating condition P i2N r i w ib y i ! P j2N r j ðw jg x Ã j þ w 0 jj v 0 j Þ is same as the required condition P i2N v i 0, when x Ã j is the optimal investment by the good camp on node j.
COMMON COUPLED CONSTRAINTS RELATING BOUNDS ON COMBINED INVESTMENT PER NODE
As motivated in Section 1.1, a sequential play would be more natural than a simultaneous one in certain scenarios, for instance, in presence of a mediator or central authority which may be responsible for giving permissions for campaigning or scheduling product advertisements to be presented to a node. We hence consider two sequential play settings, which result in Stackelberg variants of the considered game. We use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the equilibrium notion; also since it is a zero-sum game, we refer to the equilibrium as either maxmin or minmax, based on which camp plays first. Without loss of analytical generality, we conduct our analysis while assuming the good camp plays first. The bad camp would hence choose a strategy that minimizes the sum of opinion values as a best response to the good camp's strategy. Foreseeing this, the good camp would want to maximize this minimum value; this is popularly known as the backward induction approach. We hence derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy profile and the corresponding maxmin value. The minmax profile and value can be obtained symmetrically.
In this section, we consider a setting in which the combined investment on a node by both camps is bounded by a certain limit. Without loss of generality, we assume this limit to be 1 unit. This leads to the introduction of common coupled constraints (CCC):
The inner term is
Its dual problem can be written as
8i 2 N : w ib z i À g i À a 0 y i a ! 0 8i 2 N : z i 2 R; g i ! 0:
As earlier, from Equation (9), we have z i ¼ ððI À w T Þ À1 1Þ i ¼ r i . For satisfying Constraint Equation (10), it is required that 8i 2 N : r i w ib À g i À a 0 or g i ! r i w ib À a:
To maximize objective function Equation (8), it is required that g i should be as low as possible (knowing that 1 À x i ! 0). So the above condition g i ! r i w ib À a along with g i ! 0 gives 8i 2 N : g i ¼ maxfr i w ib À a; 0g:
So we need to maximize the objective function with respect to g i ; x i ; 8i 2 N and a. For this purpose, let us define a set with respect to a, namely, J a ¼ fj : r j w jb À a ! 0g:
So the objective function to be maximized is
Claim 1. It is sufficient to search the values of a 2 fr j w jb g j:r j w jb > 0 [ f0g to find an optimal solution.
A proof of Claim 1 is provided in supplemental file, available online. Now that we have established that the only possible values of optimal a are fr j w jb g j:r j w jb > 0 [ f0g, we can assume optimal a ¼ rĵwĵ b forĵ 2 fj : r j w jb > 0g [ fdg, where the dummy node d is such that r d w db ¼ 0.
Recalling the objective function in Equation (13),
Comparing this with generic objective function Equation (3) and since it should hold for any r i ; w ig ; w ib ; w 0 ii ; v 0 i , it is necessary that the coefficients of non-zero values of r i w ib are the same in both forms of the objective function. This along with the fact that 8j 2 I a : r j w jb > 0 (since a ! 0), gives P j2I a y j ¼ P j2I a ð1 À x j Þ. Also if rĵwĵ b > 0, then P j2P a y j ¼ k b À P j2I a ð1 À x j Þ. And for all other terms, we have P j = 2 J a y j ¼ 0. Since 8j 2 N : 0 y j 1 À x j , these are equivalent to
To check for the consistency of budget of the bad camp, it is necessary that P j2I a y j k b . This gives the constraint P j2I a ð1 À x j Þ k b or equivalently, X j2Ia
x j ! jI a j À k b :
Also if rĵwĵ b > 0, for the consistency of investment on the nodes in P a (that is, 8j 2 P a : x j þ y j 1), it is necessary that
x j jI a j þ jP a j À k b :
To check for the consistency of budget of the good camp, it is necessary that P j2I a x j k g and P j2I a x j þ P j2P a x j ! 0. These along with Equations (15) and (16) give jI a j À k b k g and jI a j þ jP a j À k b ! 0, or equivalently, jI a j k g þ k b and jI a j þ jP a j ! k b :
The sets I a and P a depend only onĵ. So let the set ofĵ's that satisfy the constraints in Equation (17) be denoted byJ, that is,J ¼ fĵ : jI a j k g þ k b and jI a j þ jP a j ! k b g:
The term P i2N r i w 0 ii v 0 i being a constant, and substituting a ¼ rĵwĵ b , objective function Equation (12) becomes
Hence the good camp's optimal strategy can be obtained by maximizing Equation (18) with respect to x andĵ 2J, subject to Constraints Equations (15) and (16) , and x i 2½0; 1; 8i 2 N.
A Greedy Approach for Determining Optimal Strategy
For a givenĵ, it can be seen from Equation (18) that the optimal strategy of the good camp is to determine x which maximizes P i2N x i ðr i w ig þ maxfr i w ib À rĵwĵ b ; 0gÞ. Since Constraint Equation (15) should be satisfied, the minimum total investment by the good camp on nodes belonging to set I a should be jI a j À k b . Hence it should invest in nodes belonging to I a one at a time (subject to a maximum investment of 1 unit per node) in decreasing order of values of ðr i w ig þ max fr i w ib À rĵwĵ b ; 0gÞ, until a total investment of jI a j À k b is made. Letx i be the good camp's investment on node i after this step; its remaining budget is k g À ðjI a j À k b Þ and the maximum amount that it could henceforth invest on a node i is 1 Àx i (since each node has an investment capacity of 1 unit). Now since Constraint Equation (16) should also be satisfied, the maximum total investment by the good camp on nodes belonging to set I a [ P a should be jI a j þ jP a j À k b . Hence it should now invest in nodes one at a time (maximum investment of 1 Àx i in node i) in decreasing order of values of ðr i w ig þ maxfr i w ib À rĵwĵ b ; 0gÞ until one of the following occurs: (a) the remaining budget (k g À jI a j þ k b ) is exhausted or (b) a node with a negative value of ðr i w ig þ maxfr i w ib À rĵwĵ b ; 0gÞ is reached or (c) the investment made on nodes belonging to I a [ P a reaches jI a j þ jP a j À k b . If condition (a) or (b) is met, the so obtained strategy x Ã j ¼ ðx Ã ji Þ is the optimal x for the givenĵ. However, if condition (c) is met, the good camp should continue investing the remaining available amount on nodes belonging to N n ðI a [ P a Þ one at a time (subject to a maximum investment of 1 unit per node) in decreasing order of values of ðr i w ig þ maxfr i w ib À rĵwĵ b ; 0gÞ. The so obtained strategy
Þ would hence be the optimal x for the givenĵ. The absolute optimal strategy of the good camp can now be computed by iterating over allĵ 2J and taking the one that maximizes (from Equation (18))
It can be shown that the time complexity of the above greedy approach is Oðnðk g þ k b Þ Á minfk g ; log ngÞ. We provide a discussion on complexity in the supplemental file, available online.
For the bad camp's optimal strategy, recall that X
Since y i 2 ½0; 1 À x i ; 8i 2 N, the optimal strategy of the bad camp is to invest in nodes one at a time (subject to a maximum investment of 1 À x i per node) in decreasing order of values of r i w ib until either its budget k b is exhausted or we reach a node with a negative value of r i w ib .
It can also be seen that if k g and k b are integers, it is an optimal investment strategy of the good and bad camps to invest one unit or not invest at all in a node.
Insight 3. Assuming aĵ, the strategy of the good camp is to choose nodes with good values of ðr i w ig þ maxfr i w ib À rĵwĵ b ; 0gÞ. That is, it chooses nodes with not only good values of r i w ig , but also good values of r i w ib . This is expected since the budget constraint per node allows the good camp (which plays first) to block those nodes on which the bad camp would have preferred to invest. Also, based on Equation (14) and the definitions of J a ; I a ; P a , nodeĵ can be viewed as a boundary for the bad camp's investment, that is, the bad camp would not invest in any node i such that r i w ib < rĵwĵ b .
Maxmin versus Minmax Values
Here, we compare the maxmin and minmax values of the game in the fundamental setting (Section 3.2) with that in the common coupled constraints setting. The introduction of the total budget constraints per node disturbs the equality between maxmin and minmax, as we show now. Let ðx 0 ; y 0 Þ be an optimal maxmin strategy profile in Equation (7) . Adding the constraint 0 y 1 À x restricts the set of feasible strategies for the bad camp, and this set of feasible strategies and hence its optimal strategy now depends on x. So we have These two inequalities, along with Equation (7), result in the following inequality,
This result, which is contrary to general functions (for which maxmin is less than or equal to minmax), has also been derived in [32] . In our problem, this is a direct consequence of the first mover advantage, which restricts the strategy set of the second mover. In the maxmin case as analyzed earlier, the good camp invests in nodes with good values of ðr i w ig þ maxfr i w ib À rĵwĵ b ; 0gÞ (assuming â j). That is, it is likely to invest in nodes with good values of r i w ib which are the preferred investees of the bad camp. Owing to total investment limit per node, the bad camp may not be able to invest in its preferred nodes (those with high values of r i w ib ). It can be shown on similar lines that, in the minmax case where the bad camp plays first, it would play symmetrically opposite, thus limiting the ability of good camp to invest in nodes with good values of r i w ig .
Remark 4 (CCC under simultaneous play). If instead of sequential play, the two camps play simultaneously under CCC setting, it can be seen that the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed (an immediate example is that the maxmin and minmax values could be different).
We address this precise question in [39] for general resource allocation games, albeit assuming strict preference ordering of the camps over nodes. Therein, however, we do not derive an equilibrium strategy profile since there could be infinite number of Nash equilibria. In order to derive a precise strategy profile which would be of practical and conceptual interest, we considered a sequential play in this paper and computed the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. For the case where the Nash equilibrium is unique, the sequence of play would not matter (that is, the maxmin and minmax values would be the same), and our derived subgame perfect Nash equilibrium would be the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY
In this section, we look at another sequential play setting which considers the possibility that the good camp, which plays first, may not have complete or exact information regarding the extrinsic weights, namely, w ig ; w ib ; w 0
ii . The bad camp, however, which plays second, has perfect information regarding the values of these parameters, and hence it is known that it would act optimally. Forecasting the optimal strategy of the bad camp, the good camp aims at choosing a robust strategy which would give it a good payoff even in the worst case.
Let U be a polytope defined by Eu f (that is, u 2 U). It can be viewed as the uncertainty set, which in this case, is a convex set. The polytope would be based on the application at hand and could be deduced from observations, predictions, etc. We use the framework of robust optimization [33] for solving this problem.
For the purpose of this section, let us assume that all the elements of u are non-negative. This is to ensure bounded values of the parameters. For instance, if we have a constraint in the linear program such as w ig þ w ib þ w 0 ii u i , the individual values w ig ; w ib ; w 0 ii can be unbounded. So for this current setting (under uncertain parameters), we will assume w ig ; w ib ; w 0 ii ! 0; 8i 2 N. Since the good camp aims to optimize in the worst case of parameter values, while the bad camp has knowledge of these values with certainty, the optimization problem is
If max j2N r j w jb > 0, that is, the bad camp has at least one feasible node to invest on, then we have P i2N r i w ib y i ¼ k b max j2N r j w jb , else we have P i2N r i w ib y i ¼ 0. For arriving at a concise solution, let d be a dummy node such that
The optimization problem thus is max P
Note that there are in general n þ 1 possibilities for max j2N[fdg r j w jb . We could write a linear program for each possibility of i 0 ¼ arg max j2N[fdg r j w jb . For a fixed i 0 2 N [fdg, the inner term is
For this problem to be feasible, the constraint set should be non-empty. Let N f be the subset of N [ fdg consisting of nodes i 0 such that the constraint set satisfying Eu f and 8i 2 N : r i w ib r i 0 w i 0 b is non-empty. Its dual is the following:
We need to find a common x for all possibilities of i 0 2 N f . So we have a constraint on the value of the dual, say r, namely, r Àa T i 0 f; 8i 0 . We hence obtain a solution to the optimization problem by solving the following LP. max r
We solve the above LP for a specific example in our simulation study, so as to derive insights on the effect of uncertainty on the optimal strategy of the good camp.
SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
Throughout this paper, we analytically derived the optimal investment strategies of competing camps in a social network for driving the opinion of the population in their favor. We hence presented either closed-form expressions or algorithms with polynomial running time. With the aim of determining implications of the analytically derived results on real-world networks and obtaining further insights, we conducted a simulation study on two popular network datasets. In this section, we present the setup and observed results, and provide insights behind them.
Simulation Setup
We consider an academic collaboration network obtained from co-authorships in the "High Energy Physics -Theory" papers published on the e-print arXiv from 1991 to 2003. It contains 15,233 nodes and 31,376 links among them, and is popularly denoted as NetHEPT. This network exhibits many structural features of large-scale social networks and is widely used for experimental justifications, for example, in [24] , [40] , [41] . For the purpose of graphical illustration, we use the popular Zachary's Karate club dataset consisting of 34 nodes and 78 links among them [42] .
Our analyses throughout the paper are valid for any distribution of edge weights satisfying the general constraints in Section 2.2. However, in order to concretize our simulation study, we need to consider a particular distribution of edge weights. Proposition 4 showed that some popular models of distributing edge weight in a graph would result in random strategy being optimal, and so are not suited for our simulations. Hence in order to transform an undirected unweighted network dataset into a weighted directed one for our simulations, we consider that for any node i (having d i number of connections), the tuple ðw 0 ii ; w ig ; w ib Þ is randomly generated such that 8i 2 N : w 0 ii þ w ig þ w ib ¼ 0:5; and
if there is an edge between i and j:
A primary reasoning for considering w 0 ii þ w ig þ w ib ¼ 0:5 is to have a natural first guess that nodes give equal weightage to intra-network influencing factors (fw ij g j2N ) and extra-network influencing factors (w 0 ii ; w ig ; w ib ). We provide results for the extreme cases in supplemental file, available online, namely, when the value of w 0 ii þ w ig þ w ib is 0.1 or 0.9 (with the values of the individual parameters scaled proportionally). We also highlight some key effects of this value on the obtained results, throughout this section. Fig. 1 presents the values of the parameters used for our experimentation on the Karate club dataset, considering our weight distribution with w 0 ii þ w ig þ w ib ¼ 0:5. The size and color saturation of a node i represent the value of the parameter mentioned in the corresponding caption (bigger size and higher saturation implies higher value). Unless otherwise specified, we consider k g ¼ k b ¼ 5 for this dataset. Also, unless otherwise specified, we start with an unbiased network, that is, v 0 i ¼ 0; 8i 2 N.
Progression with Time
Throughout this paper, our analyses were based on the steady state opinion values. However for the purpose of completion, we now provide a brief note on the progression of opinion values with time, which occurs according to our update rule given by Equation (1). Fig. 2 illustrates the progression of opinion values with time under the linear influence function and unbounded investment per node, where P i2N v hti i is the sum of opinion values of nodes in time step t. The network starts with v 0 i ¼ 0; 8i 2 N, and then at t ¼ 1, the good and bad camps invest their entire budgets on their respective target nodes having maximum values of r i w ig and r i w ib , respectively. Hence the opinion values of these nodes change to being highly positive and negative respectively, while other nodes still hold an opinion value of 0 ( Fig. 2a ). At t ¼ 2, nodes which are directly connected to these target nodes, update their opinions; as seen from Fig. 2b , nodes in the left region hold positive opinions while the ones in the right region hold negative opinions. Few nodes like the ones on the top, center, and extreme right regions, still hold an opinion value of 0. By t ¼ 3, all nodes hold a non-zero opinion value and at t ¼ 4, the individual opinion values and hence the sum of opinion values almost reach the convergent value. The sum of opinion values at t ¼ 4 is 0.1566 ( Fig. 2c ), while the convergent sum is 0.1564 ( Table 2 ). In general, assuming the threshold of convergence to be 10 À4 , the convergence is reached in 8-10 time steps for the Karate club dataset, and in 12-15 time steps for the NetHEPT dataset.
An important insight is that any significant changes in the opinion value of a node occur in the earlier time steps. For instance, a node which is geodesically closer to the target nodes receive influence from them in the earlier time steps, and also the influence is strong since the entries of the substochastic weight matrix w t are significantly higher for lower values of t. Hence, owing to the substochastic nature of w t , the change in a node's opinion value is insignificant at a later time step. We could also observe that the rate of convergence depends on the investment strategies, for instance, the convergence is almost immediate under the concave influence function setting where the investment is already distributed over nodes (see Figs. 5, 6 in supplemental file, available online); since this investment is made in the earliest time step, it plays a significant role in determining the nodes' convergent opinion values. Also, it is usually observed that the individual opinion values as well as sum of opinion values are, more often than not, monotone increasing or decreasing with time (see Figs. 5, 6, 7, 8 in supplemental file, available online). ii þ w ig þ w ib ¼ 0:1 and 0.9 are provided in Tables 1 and 2 of the supplemental file, available online.)
Simulation Results

The Fundamental Setting
For both the datasets, the overall opinion value is positive in the fundamental unbounded setting (3.1.1) when both camps had the same budget (first row of Table 2 ), which implies that the maximum value of r i w ig in the network was higher than the maximum value of r i w ib (as clear from Equation (3) and Proposition 2). The results of the good camp doubling its budget can also be seen (second row of Table 2 ). When both camps had the same budget, their overall influences tend to nullify each other to a great extent and so the sum of opinion values is neither exceedingly positive nor exceedingly negative. However, with the good camp doubling its budget, this additional budget could be used to have a large surplus of positive influence in the network. Actually, owing to close competition, even a slight imbalance in the camps' budgets would result in significant skewness in the overall opinion of the network.
The effect of bounded investment (Setting 3.1.2) can also be seen (third row of Table 2 ); for these particular datasets, the maxmin value decreases implying that the value of r i w ig is probably concentrated on one node, while that of r i w ib is well distributed, thus giving the bad camp an advantage in bounded (and hence distributed) investment. This can be seen from Proposition 3. Fig. 4a illustrates the case with bounded investment per node (x i ; y i 1; 8i 2 N) for the Karate club dataset. Here, the label 'c' means that, that node is invested on by both the camps with 1 unit, while 'g' or 'b' mean that the node is invested on by the good or bad camp, respectively.
The Adversary Setting
Considering the adversary setting of maximizing the competitor's (bad camp's) investment, we could see how much budget the bad camp required to draw the overall opinion in its favor. As expected from the results of the above setting where the overall opinion value turns out to be positive when the camps have the same budget, the investment required in the unbounded case of Setting 5.1 (5.1404 for Karate club and 136.5231 for NetHEPT) is more than the budget available in Setting 3.1.1 (5 for Karate club and 100 for NetHEPT). In the bounded setting (5.2), for Karate club dataset, we can see that the bad camp could have driven the overall opinion in its favor by expending 4.8936 instead of its entire budget of 5. For NetHEPT dataset, as expected from the results of the fundamental setting where the overall opinion in the bounded setting (3.1.2) was less than that in the unbounded setting (3.1.1), the investment required by the bad camp in the bounded setting (5.2) , which is 102.7266, is less than that required in the unbounded setting (5.1), which is 136.5231.
Concave Influence Function
Results under the concave influence function are presented for both unbounded (4.1) and bounded (4.2) cases for t ¼ 2 and t ¼ 10, in Table 2 . Fig. 3 shows the effect of the value of t on the distribution of investment and final opinion values for the Karate club dataset, in the unbounded case. In Figs. 3a, 3b, 3d , and 3e, the size and color saturation of a node represent the amount of investment on it by the camp mentioned in the corresponding caption. With careful observation, it can be seen that for t ¼ 2, the investments are more skewed, while for t ¼ 10, the investments by the good and bad camps on a node i are close to being proportional to the values of r i w ig and r i w ib , respectively (as suggested in Proposition 5 and Remark 1). In Figs. 3c and 3f , the shape and color of a node represent its opinion sign (blue circle implies positive, red square implies negative), while its size and color saturation represent its opinion magnitude.
In the unbounded case, for some values of budgets, there exist nodes for which either x i or y i or both exceed 1 unit. So for the bounded case, the camps are directed to have different investment strategies than in the unbounded case (as can be understood from Insight 2). The effects can be seen in Table 2 where the values are different in Settings 4.1 and 4.2 for the same values of budgets. In some scenarios such as NetHEPT with k g ¼ k b ¼ 100, however, the investment strategies inadvertently assured x i ; y i 1; 8i 2 N even for the unbounded case; so the investment strategies remain the same in both settings and hence resulted in the same overall opinion value (À0:8446 for t ¼ 2 and À12:4212 for t ¼ 10). A careful analysis of the values would indicate that the constraints x i ; y i 1 are likely to come into picture for some nodes, for lower values of t and higher values of budgets. Lower values of t lead to skewed investment and so a higher likelihood of some nodes having investment more than 1 unit in the unbounded case. Similarly, higher values of budgets scale up the investments on the nodes, resulting in a higher likelihood of some nodes having investment more than 1 unit in the unbounded case. This can also be inferred from our analytically derived investment strategies.
For w 0 ii þ w ig þ w ib ¼ 0:1 (see Fig. 3 of the supplemental file, available online), the values of extra-network parameters (w 0 ii ; w ig ; w ib ¼ 0:1) get scaled down proportionally, while the intra-network ones (w ij 's) scale up; that is, the network influence plays a stronger role than the camps' recommendations. Because of the weak impact of the camps' recommendations, that is, the nodes being unwilling to accept opinions that are external to the network, and since all nodes started with a zero initial opinion, the magnitudes of their opinion values are very low.
Furthermore, because of the strong impact of the intranetwork influence, the camps invest greatly on the most influential nodes (and not so much on the lesser influential ones), and allow the network to spread its influence. Owing to the low magnitudes of opinion values and a strong network effect which aids in distributing the influence evenly, the opinion values in the network are less skewed. For w 0 ii þ w ig þ w ib ¼ 0:9 (see Fig. 4 of the supplemental file, available online), the above reasoning gets reversed, and so the magnitudes of individual opinion values are high, the camps' investments are more evenly distributed, and the opinion values are highly skewed.
Common Coupled Constraints
Figs. 4b, and 4c illustrate the effect of common coupled constraints x i þ y i 1; 8i 2 N, for the Karate club dataset. The advantage of playing first is clearly visible from the overall opinion value as well as the distribution of opinion values. Specifically, the overall opinion value is the highest in Fig. 4b with a healthy distribution of positive opinion values, followed by the value in Fig. 4a , followed by that in Fig. 4c which is dominated by negative opinions.
For w 0 ii þ w ig þ w ib ¼ 0:9; 8i 2 N on NetHEPT dataset, we observed that max x min y 1Àx P i2N v i ¼ min y max x 1Ày P i2N v i ¼ 1:5930 (see Table 2 of the supplemental file, available online). So the camps did not have the first mover advantage; and it would not matter if the camps played sequentially or simultaneously (Remark 4). Hence the camp which plays first, could devise its investment strategy without having to consider the best response investment strategy of the camp which plays second. Also, as reasoned earlier, the opinion values are less skewed for w 0 ii þ w ig þ w ib ¼ 0:1, while highly skewed for w 0 ii þ w ig þ w ib ¼ 0:9. Fig. 4 . Results in presence of additional constraints for the Karate club dataset with k g ¼ k b ¼ 5 ; The nodes are labeled 'g/b/c' to signify if invested on by good/bad/both camps respectively. The sign of the opinion value of a node is signified by its shape and color (circle and blue for good, square and red for bad), while the absolute value of its opinion is signified by its size and color saturation.
Decision under Uncertainty
For studying the effects of decision under uncertainty as analyzed in Section 7, we consider that the good camp (first mover) is uncertain about parameters w ig and w ib up to a certain limit. In particular, there is a fractional uncertainty of l regarding the values of these parameters, while there is a fractional uncertainty of o regarding the values of the sums of these parameters over the entire network. l can be hence viewed as local uncertainty and o as global uncertainty. Letŵ ig andŵ ib be the underlying ground truth values for a node i (the actual values destined to be realized).
It is clear that the latter two constraints would come into picture only if o < l (this would usually be the case since, though there may be significant relative deviation for the individual parameters, the relative deviation of their sum is usually low owing to significant balancing of positive and negative deviations of the individual parameters). For different values of l and o , Fig. 5 presents the maxmin values: (a) as computed by the good camp (first mover) as its worst case value using our robust optimization approach and (b) as realized based on the ground truth. We assume the ground truth values as depicted in Fig. 1 . It can be seen that for a large enough range of values of l and o , though the good camp computes the worst case maxmin value to be very low, the corresponding realized value is the same as when the good camp is certain about the parameter values. The uncertainty factor starts affecting the good camp only for very high values of l and o .
As clear from our linear program formulation in Section 7, the optimal strategy of the good camp under uncertainty is a pessimistic one, that is, ensuring that the good camp performs well even in the worst case. Hence it is fundamentally different from the optimal strategy under certainty, where there is no requirement of being pessimistic or optimistic since all the information required to solve the optimization problem is known with certainty. As pointed above, the uncertainty factor plays a role only for very high values of l and o . Specifically, for values of l upto 0.6, the good camp's investment is concentrated on one node, like in the certainty setting (Proposition 2). For l in excess of 0.6, the distribution of investment showed a very similar nature across different values of l and o ; Fig. 6 illustrates how the good camp distributes its investment over nodes. Thus, the investment is distributed under high levels of uncertainty, while it is concentrated on one node under certainty as well as under low levels of uncertainty. Furthermore, one could notice a clear correlation between the values of w ig (Fig. 1a ) and the investment amounts on the corresponding nodes under high uncertainty (Fig. 6 ).
CONCLUSION
Using a variant of Friedkin-Johnsen model for opinion dynamics, we studied a zero-sum game framework for optimal investment strategies for two competing camps in a social network. We derived closed form expressions and efficient algorithms for a number of well-motivated settings. We showed all the results quantitatively as well as illustratively using simulations on network datasets.
Our analysis arrived at a decision parameter analogous to Katz centrality. We also showed that for some of the popular models of weighing edges, a random strategy is indeed optimal. We further looked at a setting where the influence of a camp on a node is a concave function of the amount of investment, and derived that a more concave function results in a less skewed investment strategy, which could be perceived as a fairer strategy by the nodes. We studied an adversarial problem where a camp aims to maximize its competitor's investment required to drive the average opinion value of the population in its favor, and saw that the optimal strategies fundamentally remain the same, albeit with different forms of the exact optimal strategies.
We then studied Stackelberg variant of the game, under common coupled constraints stating the bound on combined investment by the two camps on any node. We analytically derived the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategies of the camps, and hence quantified the firstmover advantage. We derived a linear program for obtaining optimal strategy for a camp to whom the parameters' values are uncertain, while playing against a camp having exact information. In our simulations, we observed that a camp is likely to get affected only under considerably high levels of uncertainty. Here, the optimal strategy is to have a distributed investment over nodes, as against the concentrated investment in the exact information setting.
FUTURE WORK
This work has several interesting directions for future work; we mention a few. The two camps setting can be extended to multiple camps where each camp would attempt to drive the opinion of the population towards its own. With more than two camps, we would need to have the camps hold opinions in a multidimensional plane rather than on the real number line (þ1=À1). We explain one way in which this could be done. Let each camp (say h) have a vector associated with its opinion (sayc h ). Let its investment on node i be denoted by z hi and the weightage attributed by i to the camp's opinion be w ih . Analogous to Equation (3), the vector-sum of nodes' opinions could be written as X A camp's objective would be to drive this vector-sum towards the direction of its own opinion vector, that is, to maximize the inner product between the vector-sum of nodes' opinions and its own opinion vector (that is,c h Á P i2Nṽ i ). This paper studied the special case where we have two camps: h ¼ g; b with c g ¼ þ1;c b ¼ À1 and z gi ¼ x i ; z bi ¼ y i . Since the optimization terms for different camps get decoupled under the settings in Sections 3 and 4, the optimization strategies of all camps would be analogous to those derived in this paper. However, our set of equations will not be directly adaptable for the CCC and uncertainty settings, and is an interesting direction for future work.
One could study other models of opinion dynamics with respect to optimal investment strategies of competing camps and investigate if it is possible to arrive at closed form expressions under them. One such type of models could be where the investment parameters get coupled in the optimization problem, and the sum of opinion values is no longer a multilinear function in the investment parameters fx i g i2N ; fy i g i2N . Another possible future direction is to study the setting of common coupled constraints under more complex constraints, while maintaining analytical tractability; our analysis in this paper could act as a conceptual base for solving such a problem. In general, it would be interesting to consider hybrid settings which combine the individually studied settings in this paper, for instance, a concave influence function with the cost function accounting for deviation from the desired investment. It would also be interesting to study the tradeoff between the advantages and disadvantages of playing first, since playing first would allow a camp to block certain investments of the competing camp (like in common coupled constraints) but it may also force it to take decision under uncertainty. Swapnil Dhamal received the BE degree in computer science from BITS Pilani, Goa, India, in 2010 and the PhD degree from the Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, in 2016. He is currently a postdoctoral researcher with INRIA Sophia Antipolis M editerran ee, France, working with Laboratoire Informatique d'Avignon. He was previously a postdoctoral researcher with T el ecom SudParis (CNRS). His research is based on application of game theory and optimization to socio-economic networks, resource allocation, and blockchain mining. 
